1) The KDP is the most responsible actor for inhibiting #Yazidi post-genocide recovery & preventing resettlement/reconstruction in #Sinjar. The @HudsonInstitute should be cognizant of these well-documented issues before featuring a mouthpiece who routinely defends these abuses.
2) A perusal of any number of articles/reports would enlighten event organizers as to the reaction of incredulity that such an embarrassing choice engenders on the part of Iraqi minorities and those involved in advocacy, humanitarian endeavors, and human rights work.
3) A good place to start for essential background is "The KRG’s Relationship with the Yazidi Minority and the Future of the Yazidis in Shingal (Sinjar):" joshualandis.com/blog/krgs-rela…
4) A second essential resource is the @hrw report documenting the economic blockade levied by the KDP against #Sinjar—the existence of which is routinely denied by KDP spokespersons: hrw.org/news/2016/12/0…
5) Today, almost 2 1/2 years since the blockade began, it is more severe than ever. During the first year of its implementation, the blockade prevented Yazidis from carrying goods and materials to their homes—from food to live on to supplies needed to rebuild their damaged homes.
6) But now the blockade even prevents Yazidis from traveling from the IDP camps in Dohuk—where they have been forced to live for almost 4 years—to their homes in Sinjar. Yazidis wishing to travel to Sinjar must travel through Mosul, a route that creates significant fear.
7) Some KDP-owned media have been brazen enough to blame the blockade on the Hashd al-Sha'bi—this is a blatant lie. The approach of the KDP to disputed territories is: "If we don't get to rule you, we'll make sure you starve."
8) Third, on KDP techniques for cooptation of minority faces to legitimize their political messaging—which extends into parading token minority faces at public events—see sections on patronage in the report “Erasing Assyrians” (pp. 35-41; 55-56): joshualandis.com/blog/krg-targe…
9) On minority perceptions of the Kurdish mission to Washington—which effectively serves the function of PR and propaganda to deflect attention from these seriously harmful policies—see Part Four of the "Erasing Assyrians" report (pp. 74-75): joshualandis.com/blog/krg-targe…
10) Fourth, on KDP attempts to railroad disputed territories into accepting KRG annexation, see "Resolving Article 140: Settling the Issue of Iraq’s Disputed Territories Ahead of an Independence Referendum for Kurdistan:" joshualandis.com/blog/resolving… @meganconnelly48
11) Fifth—and perhaps most importantly for the @HudsonInstitute event—see my article on last year's #Yazidi Genocide memorial which involved the flagrant exploitation of Yazidi suffering for KDP political gain: joshualandis.com/blog/krg-targe…
12) The resources I've listed here are mainly just a few of those that I've been personally involved in. If one would spend a single day of research, one would encounter many more resources from a variety of organizations, journalists, and institutions raising related concerns.
13) Think tanks like the @HudsonInstitute must speak to power and take a stand for human rights, rather than give platforms to the representatives of authoritarian interests who justify their policies by parading a few tokenistic, co-opted individuals around their events.
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1) Today—on the 4th anniversary of the Kocho Massacre, when #IS slaughtered an entire town as part of the Yazidi Genocide—#Turkey bombed a #Yazidi convoy in #Sinjar that was returning from the Kocho Massacre memorial ceremony, killing Mam Zaki, an important Yazidi #PKK leader.
2) The convoy contained leaders & members of the Yazidi #YBŞ defense force and affiliated political institutions, including Mazlum Shingal, the military commander of the #YBŞ, who—like Mam Zaki—is also a #Yazidi. Mazlum (shown in photo) was injured but not killed in the attack.
3) A #Yazidi from #Sinjar (Tel Ezeir) named Harbo, a member of the Self-Administrative Council (a local governing institution that is a civilian political counterpart to the YBŞ defense force), was injured in the attack. Two others were killed; their identities are not yet known.
@RichardDawkins 1) Some church bells sound nice. Others clang annoyingly and sound like a hammer smacking a cooking pot. Sometimes the adhan (Muslim call to prayer) is delivered in an aurally pleasing way by the muadhan (the man who calls). At other times it can be a terrible affront to the ear.
@RichardDawkins 2) Muslims don't like to think of the adhan as "singing," but in fact in many countries the adhan is delivered in one of the Arabic maqams—musical scales used in traditional music of the Middle East/Arab World. It can have a very musical quality, depending on the muadhan's skill.
@RichardDawkins 3) In Syria one can commonly hear, for example, an adhan chanted in the "bayat maqam," the same musical scale that you would hear in many typical Fayruz songs. In more puritanical contexts, like in Saudi Arabia, the adhan can be simply spoken rather than chanted.
@RichardDawkins 1) Some church bells sound nice. Others clang annoyingly and sound like a hammer smacking a cooking pot. Sometimes the adhan (Muslim call to prayer) is delivered in an aurally pleasing way by the muadhan (the man who calls). At other times it can be a terrible affront to the ear.
@RichardDawkins 2) Muslims don't like to think of the adhan as "singing," but in fact in many countries the adhan is delivered in one of the Arabic maqams—musical scales used in traditional music of the Middle East/Arab World. It can have a very musical quality, depending on the muadhan's skill.
@RichardDawkins 3) In Syria one can commonly hear, for example, an adhan chanted in the "bayat maqam," the same musical scale that you would hear in many typical Fayruz songs. In more puritanical contexts, like in Saudi Arabia, the adhan can be simply spoken rather than chanted.