I've written about Magecart compromise of customer data at Sophias Style (who've been informed) - the Javascript used is supplied differently server side depending on which page you're browsing from, to hinder security research doublepulsar.com/magecart-new-t…
This is the code you see on a non-cart page vs the code supplied when you register and go on a payment page. Exactly same .js URL.
There has been a great mobilisation in infosec to try to tackle parts of Magecart now. Several hundred infected sites have been ID’d today, many UK retailers contacted, and work is going on to take down core infrastructure behind some of the attacks.
Check out the regex, looking for generic checkout processes 😬
The Feedify thing is real, I've put in some YARA rules on web browsing threat intel feeds and it doesn't look like this is an isolated library either. Fun. Now I'm off to play Call of Duty and drink beer while I realise breaches are coming.
US gov report into Equifax breach, 40 pages, worth a read. They essentially had a lack of asset inventory, vulnerable infrastructure, and failures in SecOps (eg vuln mgmt didn’t identify Struts issue, 10 month expired certificate so no monitoring etc) gao.gov/assets/700/694…
The expired certificate is likely going to be IDS not working - if you can afford SSL decryption (you want to budget for this ideally) somebody has to maintain the SSL certs for in line decryption, so you have to budget for that too.
The front line dispute portal (which was built on Struts) had access to a database with plain text admin credentials across Equifax - with no network segmentation internally, attacker just surfed through their network. With end to end encryption (and no decryption) for attacker.
There’s a new CPU vulnerability with a website, logo (free to use), website with no mitigation advice etc. Spin up the Vulnerability Hype Train while I analyse. foreshadowattack.eu
Re hotel issue at Black Hat and DEF CON. I think both orgs should work together to agree clear standards for room entry with all venues. If venues don’t agree to generally accepted terms, they should not be venues.
Pragmatically organisers will need to accept certain things and communicate these to attendees. But some things are really important - eg room entry by security while attendee in room needs clear ID, with hotel security phone # to verify creds *before entry*.
I am not a big fan over the response over this one by organisers, as the initial take was treating it as just a privacy issue. It’s not. It’s a security issue. At a security conference. If cons want to be taken seriously when they say protect attendees, this is one to address.