Thread by @WylieNewmark

In furtherance of the #counterintelligence discussion around the GRU and its competency, I want to address some recent reporting and analysis. Two articles - and one shared question - come to mind. /1

The 1st article takes the kind of argument I've made - the GRU has been sloppy resulting even successes generating some effects one would associate with qualified failures - and runs with it to the extreme. /2 bloomberg.com/view/articles/…

I have done my best to put as much nuance into my threads on this. I don't think so much that the GRU is incompetent (they have achieved numerous significant mission objectives) as that their tradecraft and OPSEC leaves much to desired, with that likely hurting them w/ Putin. /3

The 2nd article emphasizes this idea of not underestimating the GRU, particularly b/c since the Skripal op was "likely as much about sending a message to London as killing one traitor, the furor may even be considered a feature rather than a bug." /4 foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/rus…

I believe that the brazenness of this operation clearly was a feature, incorporated in its design and may be related what appears to have been a lack of concentrated counter-CCTV efforts by the GRU in the Skripal op. /5

https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1037711348447277057

That brings me to the question I've been thinking and talking to others about: why wasn't the GRU more careful with their tradecraft in the UK, especially after the other tradecraft/OPSEC-related blunders in the last few years? /6

I've felt my views evolve over the last day or so & two tweets I think reflect this best. The 1st is on the idea that this is a case (in the words of @jckichen) of "uneven application of tradecraft" justified by op planners by the brazenness of the op. /7

https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1037705370951733249

The 2nd is that the Kremlin - for whatever reason - did not push for the GRU to take something this more seriously when the final version of the operation went up to Putin & co. for approval. I can think of a few reasons. /8

https://twitter.com/WylieNewmark/status/1037734505333764096

One is that Putin just didn't care at all and made that clear, in line with the theme of the operation's brazenness and its intent to be as blatant as possible while still being a clandestine operation while it was executed. /9

Another is that the Kremlin didn't realize it needed to be pressing GRU to be more careful than it was in execution. Could be the op plans submitted were fuzzed or didn't even address it. Or that the the Kremlin assumed GRU knew it needed to be cool on this. Who knows. /10

One thing I still don't think the Kremlin expected, in any case, was the significant blowback the Skripal attack has caused them: degradation of intelligence capacities & capabilities abroad, sanctions, furtherance of political isolation. /11

I'm not saying that better tradecraft would've reduced these impacts; the fact that Russian signed the attack so bluntly guaranteed impacts like that. But it's possible that improved tradecraft could have delayed these consequences by prolonging the investigation. Maybe? /12

At the end of the day, the dog Putin is going to kick in the ribs and blame for consequences here remains the GRU. And the FSB, with the SVR quietly supporting it, is more than happy to egg Putin on in that regard. /13~

Somehow the Bloomberg link in this thread got scrambled. This is the correct link to the article that I don't agree with. bloomberg.com/view/articles/…