PropOrNot ID Service 🇺🇸

@propornot

Oct 30, 2017 • 32 tweets • 10 min read • Read on X

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#IndictmentEve history THREAD: Roger Stone says he was pressuring Trump to run for Pres in 1988. So was the KGB. /1 theguardian.com/us-news/2016/d…

The 1st publicly documented contact between Trump & Soviet-bloc intel was in 1977, from declassified secret Czech spy archives abt Trump /2

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More from @propornot

PropOrNot ID Service 🇺🇸

@propornot

Sep 20, 2018

THREAD: Let's talk about an interesting bot that was set up as part of a larger Russian attack on us, but recently changed its stripes:

It goes by @propornotapp, was created using infrastructure in Belgium, & has recently started following accounts we interact with. /1

It previously went by "CensoredByPropOrNot" & was an obvious attempt to legitimize Russian propaganda, delegitimize our efforts, & delegitimize related efforts broadly.

This is what it looked like before its recent rebrand: /2 web.archive.org/web/2017041509…

We expect this rebranding of "@propornotapp" will be used to pretext information from resistance members, delegitimize us & the resistance, & spread chaos & confusion amongst the allies generally.

This is what it looks like after its recent rebrand: /3 web.archive.org/web/2018091019…

PropOrNot ID Service 🇺🇸

@propornot

Aug 23, 2018

BREAKING: Twitter just suspended a whole bunch of high-reach Russian propaganda accounts, some using infrastructure in Mexico. We've been tracking them too, with @ushadrons @josh_emerson & more. Example:

@militaryearth - 4,686 tweets 425k followers
web.archive.org/web/2018081005…
/1

They systematically reused known Internet Research Agency content, which allowed us to positively ID them, although we were able to ID them as probably-Russian via technical means as well, like this:

@_MilitaryStrong - 2,816 tweets 96.8k followers
/2

These accounts were primarily focused on building an audience, & only "fired for effect" via the insertion of pro-Trump/Kremlin content at key moments. They mostly just posted viral pictures appealing to military/police/gun-loving audiences.

Example of cross-promotion: /3

PropOrNot ID Service 🇺🇸

@propornot

Aug 13, 2018

FAKE ACCOUNT ALERT: Be aware that the @_peterstrzok account going viral now is almost certainly NOT actually run by the real Peter Strzok. It was created using infrastructure in Pakistan.

This is an example of how foreign actors can hijack/sabotage American political discourse.

@_peterstrzok This tweet is gathering likes & retweets very quickly, which makes sense considering how timely it feels - but it actually just points to the dangerous vulnerability of our public sphere. Hostile foreign govs can hack our news cycle all too easily:

https://twitter.com/_peterstrzok/status/1029104137030578177

@_peterstrzok They added "parody account" to their account description literally just minutes after we called them out for being fake:

PropOrNot ID Service 🇺🇸

@propornot

Aug 8, 2018

THREAD: Let's look at how subtle Russian propaganda can be, using the framing/premises/assumptions of this seemingly-interesting but actually terrible Meduza article about Russian hackers as an example.

Follow along, if you could please. The Devil is in the details. /1

https://twitter.com/meduza_en/status/1026930648873881601

The piece starts with a total crock of BS. Russian propaganda always blames Russia's victims, & this piece does the same thing. In practice, Russia had been illegally occupying Georgian territory since 1991 & their GRU-led proxy forces executed their plan to attack Aug 5th. /2

According to RU general Yury Baluevsky, "a decision to invade Georgia was made by Putin before Medvedev was inaugurated President ... in May 2008. A detailed plan of military action was arranged and unit commanders were given specific orders in advance" /3 goodreads.com/quotes/7980947…

PropOrNot ID Service 🇺🇸

@propornot

Jul 20, 2018

We had something to do with this 😎❤️🇺🇸

The full story of how Russian intelligence used Crimson Hexagon to create a cross-platform social media intelligence-gathering system called Mediaimpuls has yet to be told... But it's going to be. Background: civilfund.ru/article/2740

https://twitter.com/dseetharaman/status/1020370977190948864

The Kremlin wanted a system that could gather intelligence on the entire global public sphere - hence "Mediaimpuls". But, they had trouble getting direct access to Facebook. They tried a whole bunch of tricks to make that happen. Let's look at the history of Russia/FB real quick:

In 2009, a Russian intelligence front conglomerate, Digital Sky Technologies, bought a couple % of Facebook on VERY generous terms, & FB hired some VERY relevant Russian nationals in the months that followed. They begin internal information-gathering. gigaom.com/2012/05/08/why…

PropOrNot ID Service 🇺🇸

@propornot

Jul 19, 2018

We often ask accounts that parrot Kremlin talking points to prove that they're run by Americans - by posting a video of themselves (no face), holding a hand-written note containing their account name & today's date, at a geolocatable landmark.

It works. Go thou & do likewise.

https://twitter.com/jllundqu/status/1019758816248786944

If an account is acting like a hostile propaganda troll account & can't authenticate itself by posting a video establishing its location in the US, it's reasonable to infer that it is in fact a hostile propaganda troll account, & treat it accordingly.

This helps clarify matters.

Sometimes accounts/personas that act as outlets for hostile propaganda are in fact run by American useful idiots, as in the case above.

Demanding they prove their location solves the "useful idiot"/"enemy troll" question, & the decision to engage further can be made from there.

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