1) No EU member will "pay more or receive less over the remainder of the current budget plan" (2014-2020) - so UK pays 2 x €10bn - viz €20bn to fill hole in current EU budget left by Brexit /2
2) "The UK will honour commitments we have made during the period of our membership."
Mrs May did NOT specify what this mean. The EU wants to know.
Given EU emphasis on filling 2014-2020 budget hole, the UK had 1) would be enough for 'sufficient progress'. It wasn't. /3
So what do the EU want now?
They say that the Brits should utter just 'one sentence'.
This would be something like: "UK will honour commitments during the period of membership....*including RAL, pensions, contingent liabilities*
Easy-peasy, no? So why doesn't UK say it? 4/
Several reasons:
1. The EU does not just want the sentence. They want what @MichelBarnier called an "objective interpretation" of those Florence undertakings.
So it's not just 'a sentence'. UK officials clear it is EU wants to define number in a "narrow band" 5/
So in practice, the UK argues, the EU wants the bill pretty much agreed *before* discussion on transition/trade/future relationship.
UK does NOT see this as fair definition of 'sufficient progress' OR as a good use of €40bn-€60bn 6/
This is particularly true if the EU offer on trade/future remains a binary Norway v CETA choice
€40-€60bn is a lot to pay for a poor trade deal that favours EU goods over UK services.
Of course, UK can walk at end of A50 and pay nowt, but in real world that's a non choice 7/
2. The UK does NOT agree on shape and size of RAL - the 'reste a liquider' which is the approx €250bn share of outstanding commitments that will be left after Brexit.
The UK disputes fair UK share of RAL, which fluctuates according to value of sterling - weaker pound shrinks basis of UK share, which could make €billions of difference if it is say 12%, 13% etc /9
The UK also disputes basis of calculation for pension liabilities as @BrunoBrussels has reported. Depending on what investment return rate you use as basis for calculation of liability could make €5-7bn difference. /10
Then there is question of UK share of EU assets (are they netted off?) and other much more minor questions like 'decommitment rates', ie factoring in the share of unspent EU commitments in any budget cycle.
In short, the UK reckons plenty to haggle over /11
3. As noted above, Boris is not apparently squared off on the €40bn-€60bn bill, and the need to pretty much agree it up front in order to progress.
The result is, for now, a political vacuum - the absence of a plan, until the cabinet can agree one. /12
The difficulty of that is that Boris - and to some extent Davis - are right to argue that the EU, when given concessions, just pocket them and move on.
May *did* move in Florence, but EU simply asked for more.
If UK writes *that* sentence, they'll ask again. /13
The problem is that the EU, led by France and Germany, are not being 'helpful'. They are playing serious hardball.
When Michel Barnier suggested twin-track transition/bill talks in October to ease deadlock, he was told 'no'. /14
This is why breaking the deadlock is not just about choreography - though there is an element of that - but about substantive issues.
The EU is demanding May not so much climbs down, but capitulates entirely.
As I have said, Article 50 gives them that option. /15
But the danger is equally that the terms are so grim, that Mrs May cannot sell the cabinet on the idea of blowing UK's entire chip-stack before the serious talks have even begun.
The UK may have no choice but to fold. But on these terms, it might not be without drama
/16 ENDS
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Yesterday @simoncoveney was talking "flexibility". /1
@eucopresident@campaignforleo@simoncoveney Then this morning, the FT reported that Ireland was prepared to back British proposal for all-UK customs arrangement on the backstop /2
@eucopresident@campaignforleo@simoncoveney This wasn't surprising. Always been Dublin ambition, but clearly they need to balance need to preserve UK-IE trade, with being good EU27 citizens and defending integrity of single market.
The Irish FT briefing was seen as a sign of helpfulness on UK side.
Now it seems like the British government also issued her a visa.
The fitness of the Polish judicial system is already under review relating to the European Arrest Warrant.
Now it seems like Germany and UK are not showing solidarity with Poland on Schengen Information System./2
The activist says she's in trouble because of a Facebook post her husband made calling for peaceful civil disobedience against Poland judicial reforms.
Poland justified the ban saying her NGO has "opaque" funding. /3
Let's be clear, there has been some silly stuff from both sides - @EmmanuelMacron should know better that talking about "liars" and @eucopresident trolling May on Instagram is also pretty daft. /2
@EmmanuelMacron@eucopresident But divorces get like this: both sides know the mud-slinging it is counter-productive, "bad for the kids" but still can't help themselves.
Jeremy Hunt's speech was pretty much student union level stuff, as has been pointed out. /3
@BorisJohnson And when you read it in that light, it becomes rather more persuasive.
Brexit is indeed a muddle and a mess. The British frog is indeed being boiled. Brexit probably always was/is more binary than both sides have properly allowed. /2
@BorisJohnson I am not at all sure Boris is right that Whitehall and the EU conspired to keep the UK in a customs union, for example, but that will be a powerful anti-narrative if that's where we end up.
FWIW my conversations in Europe suggest rather different. /3
These divisions were always over-reported and over-spun by No-10. Yes, some say different but in 27 context (viz Orban last week) they don’t. And drill down with their dips on how far they really support splitting freedoms? Not so much. I’ve tried. Doesn’t stack up IMO.
Then May/No10 over reads what she gets told in bilaterals (where she is wooden and hopeless) and takes what one EU dip from big EU state said to me were “mere generalities, pleasantries” about “wanting a deal” for a willingness to cross major red lines. Salzburg says not.
May’s problem is that she’s asking for special treatment in the Trump-Orban-Salvini era and Macron’s people says he sees Brexit in that sweep. As does Commission and Berlin (though less aggressively) which makes U.K. pitch v hard.