The official #Aadhaar#android app is sending an SMS to authenticate the user. In general, to avoid abuses, you add a sending rate limit. The user has to wait 2 minutes before resend the SMS. @UIDAI did not implement this kind of limit in the app. What are the consequences?
An attacker can extract the authentication HTTPS request made by the official #Aadhaar#android app. After that he just has to write a small script which will try all the possible #Aadhaar numbers.
The attacker will be able to flood the all #India population and @UIDAI will lose a lot of money.
.@UDAI don't be stupid, remove the official #Aadhaar#android app from the PlayStore, this is the best move you have.
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First thing first, we are talking about this app "Bolo Messenger - Secure Chat, Voice & Video Calls" which is the new version of the #Kimbho app play.google.com/store/apps/det…
When you send a message with the #Bolo app, it is checking if your contact is online with this request. The endpoint is taking the "contact userId" (the 1st black rectangle in the picture)
Time for a new thread. The #android#application called @moinsbete is one of the most downloaded applications in France. This app is sending without your consent your personal data to @mopub:
- location
- operator
- mcc
- mnc
- country
- screen size
Yes, all these requests to @mopub are HTTP requests... Welcome to 2018...
This is a very good example of data abuse. Every time you open the @moinsbete#android#app with location on, your location is send without your consent to an US based server owned by @mopub
The samples are available on @koodous_project and @virusbay_io
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