Thread by @Rich_Glick

I write tonight to express strong reservations about @FERC’s approach to MOPR and state policies. #FERC is approving #CASPR, for all of the wrong reasons! Follow me below into the #TweetStorm

I disagree strongly with the order’s suggestion that state sponsored resources must either be subject to a Minimum Offer Price Rule (#MOPR) or some alternative mechanism for “accommodating” the effects of state public policies.

That rationale—which is not adopted by a majority of the Commissioners that support the order—is ill-conceived, misguided, and a serious threat to consumers, the environment and, in fact, the long-term viability of the Commission’s capacity market construct.

The suggestion in today’s order that the Commission will rely on MOPRs—or something similar—to mitigate the impacts of state public policies will eventually come to rank as a historically serious misstep.

I am concerned that a broad application of the MOPR usurps the authority over generation resource decisions that Congress left to the states when it enacted the Federal Power Act

The better course of action would be for @FERC & the RTOs/ISOs to stop using the MOPR to interfere with state public policies and, instead, apply the MOPR in only the limited circumstance for which it was originally intended: to prevent the exercise of buyer-side market power.

The Federal Power Act is clear that states, not the Commission, are the entities primarily responsible for shaping the generation mix

Given Congress’ design &, in particular, the allocation of jurisdiction over generation to the states, I believe that a Commission policy of “mitigating,” rather than facilitating, state public policy preferences places @FERC in a role that Congress never intended it to play

Our federal, state, and local governments have long played a pivotal role in shaping all aspects of the energy sector, including electricity generation

I do not believe that it is—or should be—the Commission’s mission to create an electricity market free from governmental programs aimed at legitimate policy considerations, such as clean air and combatting climate change

There is no way to untangle the capacity mkt from the various govt programs that shape the electricity sector & there is nothing in the FPA that supports @FERC's approach of applying MOPR to particular forms of state govt involvement while ignoring other significant govt actions

There is nothing in the record that supports the conclusion that, to ensure resource adequacy in New England, the Commission must act to ensure that investors in all forms of generation—both existing and new—remain confident that they will recover their costs

My concerns with the MOPR go beyond its effect on state public policies

The MOPR will, in certain cases, prevent states from relying on their chosen resource mix while also using the funds extracted from consumers to further impede those state policies

The MOPR, thus, not only blunts the impact of state policies, it forces consumers to prop up generators with attributes that may be inconsistent with the policies adopted by state legislators and regulators.

For more, please see my full statement here
➡️ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/…