For years, nonproliferation experts & #NorthKorea watchers have suspected the existence of covert uranium enrichment sites in the country. Now, for the first time, we've found one. Introducing the Kangson enrichment site: thediplomat.com/2018/07/exclus… (cc @ArmsControlWonk)
A few notes on this site: it's literally in a suburb of Pyongyang, close to Kim Il Sung's propagandized birthplace (Mangyongdae). It was "hiding" in plain site; it was not an underground site, contrary to earlier reports.
As noted in the article, there's good evidence that North Korea had started building & even operating it in the early 2000s. USIC took until 2010 to designate it a nuclear program-relevant site. That speaks to the difficulties of intelligence analysis & collection in North Korea.
In 2002, USIC *did* nonetheless point out the existence of North Korea's covert HEU program—what led to the collapse of the Agreed Framework. Perhaps that wasn't based on finding this site, but on DPRK's mass importation of centrifuge components.
And, anyway, this site is very significant for NK's overall fissile material supply chain. Remember this DIA/NGA assessment from last year on fissile material? thediplomat.com/2017/08/us-int…
The estimate of material for 60 weapons seemed very high to many well-informed folks. Assuming just HEU production at Yongbyon, that's true. But Kangson informed that estimate too—and appears to be a significant contributor to DPRK enrichment capacity.
Mahathir Mohammad at @CFR_org. First question on Chinese economic influence in #Malaysia. "Previous government borrowed too much money."
Says he explained to China that Najib was the problem and not Beijing. But now he's talking about payment pathways privileging Chinese SoEs over local contractors. "That is not good for us. Malaysian contractors have no role to play."
"Colonialism can take many forms. Countries can be subject to pressure through economic systems and that is a form of colonialism also." - Mahathir
What's alluring about Yongbyon would be the limitation of tritium production, especially if verifiable. Of course, that's a far cry from what the 9/19 Pyongyang declaration suggests.
I'm maybe too cynical, but its inclusion in the declaration seems purely instrumental to incentivize the US to return to high-level talks/a second summit. It'll work in that sense.
April 4, 1993: Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin chat about the North Koreans — "Do you believe that the younger Kim is having any influence here?" (Kim Jong Il was the "younger" Kim at the time.)
July 10, 1993 — Clinton reflects on Japan and the NPT.
The way Clinton talks about sanctions/inducements/altering North Korean behavior here jumps out.
Oh my: "A source also noted that North Korea believes Trump made the same promise to Kim Yong Chol, a top North Korean official close to Kim Jong Un, at the White House on June 1"
So, it all makes sense now. Without it being put in writing, Trump gave KJU in Singapore (and possibly KYC) assurances that he'd do an EoW declaration; his advisors disagree. The bill has come due & admin split on paying up.
One piece of the puzzle now is why NK hasn't made this part of its public messaging about the summit (i.e., as the US has kept trumpeting about what was "agreed to by Chairman Kim in Singapore," so too could DPRK trumpet what was "agreed to by President Trump in Singapore").
Some more insight on the mysterious Kim Yong Chol letter: Pompeo’s NK visit cancelled because of demands for immediate end-of-war declaration, NIS says english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_e…
The Moon administration is also on board with an EoW declaration by the end of 2018, with "complete denuclearization" to follow; KYC wasn't out of phase with the inter-Korean understanding here.
Re-reading Trump's June 12 presser remarks, this bit sticks out to me—did he verbally give Kim assurances that the US would sign on to an EoW declaration/treaty? KYC might want to see the money now. (This is why it's good to write things down.)