#MH17 JIT statement on the @mod_russia presser:
"In May 2018 the JIT specifically requested information concerning numbers found on several recovered missile parts." but Russia left them unanswered, I guess they prefer to communicate via press conference om.nl/actueel/nieuws…
#MH17 JIT - "The JIT will meticulously study the materials presented today as soon as the Russian Federation makes the relevant documents available to the JIT as requested in May 2018 and required by UNSC resolution 2166."
Here the #MH17 JIT effectively calls the Russian Ministry of Defence out as liars:
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The details about the VIPS/Ray McGovern statement on the August 21st 2013 Sarin attacks which caused a stir at the time is very interesting, tells you a lot about how they operate. statecrime.org/data/2018/07/N…
Thread - So the Russian MoD is claiming there's something dodgy about the lighting in the videos, but it's just misinterpreting the shadows and objects. I'll explain how. 1/
The Russian MoD uses the following images to claim the white part of the cabin on the top right shouldn't be visible in shadows. In the second image we see the white part of the top of the cabin turn black when it enters the shadow, but the top right part doesn't 2/
But this is based on the idea the top of the truck that goes dark is white, but it's not. It's a dark band that's reflecting sunlight making it look white in the low quality footage, and without the reflecting light it's much darker. Here's an earlier photo of the same truck. 3/
OP#37: All the World is Staged: An Analysis of Social Media Influence Operations against US Counterproliferation Efforts in Syria nonproliferation.org/op37-all-the-w…
Interesting findings about online influence efforts apparently by the Russian Federation following the April 7th 2018 Douma chlorine attack in the new James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies report
The remains of the chlorine IRAMs used by pro-government forces in chemical attacks against Douma on January 22 and February 1 2018 according to the new @UNCoISyria report were well documented by @STJ_SYRIA_ENG as part of a joint report with @Bellingcatbellingcat.com/news/mena/2018…
The Saraqib February 4 2018 chlorine attack was executed by pro-government forces, according to the new @UNCoISyria report. It's worth noting the modified gas cylinders used in that attack have many similarities with those used in the April Douma attack bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018…
The new @UNCoISyria report also states "[a] vast body of evidence" suggests "a gas cylinder containing a chlorine payload delivered by helicopter" was used in the April 7 2018 Douma attack. Only one side is using helicopters in this conflict.
According to @mod_russia we can expect to see staged footage of a chlorine attack in Jisr al-Shugur published on social media by the end of the day. Let's see if that very specific prediction comes true, or they're just lying, as usual.
Only last week this notorious Aleppo MP and war crime denialist was telling us all about his sources in Jisr al-Shugur and their claims there would be a false flag chemical attack on Friday. That didn't happen either.
Aircraft spotters working with Hala Systems spotted
multiple Hips from the Vehicles School helicopter base in Hama. Hips
were sighted by different spotters on a route towards Haas underground
hospital after that, then around the area Haas hospital is in just
before it was bombed.
A useful video from Idlib Media Center, giving a detailed look at the entrance area and how badly damaged it was. Some will (and already are) claiming it was an Al-Qaeda bunker or something. Looks like a hospital to me.
So here's a geolocation challenge for you #digitalsherlocks, these two photographs may show the moment Haas hospital was bombed, but can they be geolocated?