P B Jijeesh Profile picture
Dec 16, 2017 45 tweets 13 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
If we take into account the amount we spen don AADHAAR and the amount various irganisations are still spending and the charges for each and evey verification process at retail stage, the profit will be negative. (7/n)
Having seen that #Aadhaar is not feasible technologically or economically. We will move to Rights. I have another thread explaining how Aadhaar violates Universal Declaration of Human Rights here
(9/n)
Since, #Aadhaar involves mandatory collection of biometric and demographic data, and its centralised storage, it essentially involves the question of #Privacy . Especially in country where there are no Data protection frameworks.
(10/n)
Even Prisoners act has some privacy clause, where it mandates deleting of all measurements n data collected from a person when he is released, unless there is court order. But #Aadhaar stores our info. Treating us worse than prisoners.
(11/n)
Another important Act is census act, where data collected under this is not open to inspection and is inadmissible in court. That means personal profiling is not allowed. At the same time allowing the govt to get a profile of entire population.
(12/n)
#Aadhaar allows for personal profiling and is accessible to various govt and private agencies. An order from bureaucrat (havng rank of Joint Secretary) will alllow enforcement agencies to access the data. It is worse than protection under Telegrah act.
(13/n)
say that data collected under #Aadhaar is minimal and CIDR is secure and not open to anybody. This is worthless because various registrars are allowed to collect information in addition to KYR.
(14/n)
People are made to give their info in KYR+ form. This include many other sensitive data like, cast (SC/ST/OBC/GEN). Bank accounts details, occupation, income and many more (15/n)
The data is stored in State Resident Data Hubs (SRDHs) which are outside the purview of #Aadhaar Act. These databases which are seeded with UID enrolment numbers initially are eventually fed with corresponding Aadhaar numbers. SRDH is accessible to various agencies
(16/n)
across various platforms for various purposes. Basically different data silos are bridged here to produce a virtual profile. A 360° view of the population is achieved. Actually the term '360° view' ubiquitous is in all SRDH related docs released bay various govt agencies
(17/n)
This amounts to surveillance, not just by govt, but also by various private players who have access to this data. #Aadhaar actually creates a sutuation of State Surveillance and Social Surveillance.
(18/n)
Another important asoect of #privacy Privis data protection. Data protection legislation is a prerequisite for any Aadhaar like projects. Here in India we have none. Data protection provisions in IT act and Aadhaar Act are not enough for a project like this
(19/n)
IT act covers only body coporates who misuse our data. That means government agencies or non-profit companies like @NPCI_NPCI Npcare outside its purview. So we have no scope fir remedy under IT Act.
(20/n)
Under Aadhaar Act there is hardly any grievance redressal mechanism. There is no office or authority to complain to. No responsible person or official to approach. The only toll free number 1947 is managed by some poor call centre executive with no authority or knowledge.
(21/n)
If you are thinking of aproching a court of law, that also is not possible under the act, as it allows only @UIDAI to initiate the action. Will they act when they themselves are the main culprits?
(22/n)
This is all the more important when reports abt misuse of eKYC and biometric authentication are pouring in from different parts of the country. It is reported that over 47cr has been deposited in Airtel payment bank accounts
(23/n)
When they opened payment bank accounts for their mobile subscribers, by using eKYC without, consent.
(24/n)
This happened becoz of faulty payment mechanism built on #Aadhaar platform run by @NPCI_NPCI . Under AEPS they map only Aadhaar number and bank code, unlike NEFT/RTGS of the RBI that uses account number for identifying individuals n IFSC code for identifying bank branch
(25/n)
As payment is linked onky to Aadhaar, NPCI database is deleted and rewritten each time ee open a new bank account. The payment will go only to the last account to which aadhaar is seeded.
(26/n)
This has resulted in many ppl losing money to payment vanks, wrongly seeded accounts etc. This will be a great platform for digital #BlackMoney in the coming years
(27/n)
AEPS and eKYC endangers transparency accountability in banking system
(28/n)
We will come back to discussion about how aadhaar is going to destroy our banking system in another thread. Ket us stick on #privacy nd FRs now (29/n)
Other important issue is exclusion. Which violates article 21, Right to Life. But for all the talk about financial inclusion, we must understand that any biometric system is by design meant for exclusion (30/n)
Sorry my phone battery is dying. Will continue in the evening.
For egs, a biometric door is intended to stop somebody who doesn't have a matching biometrics, not to allow in somebody standing in the street. Similarly #Aadhaar Aadhis not something that will enable the poor and excluded multitude
(31/n)
Its not like ration card, that assures you access to PDS. Having an Aadhaar number wont enable you to access anything. It just nakes another layer of difficulty in accessing services. That is, if a poor person have ration card, but dont have aadhaar he will b denied ration
(32/n)
Even if u r poor, BPL, and possess ration card and had it linked with #Aadhaar . U will b denied any ration, if biometric authentication fails at ration shops.
(33/n)
Primarily #Aadhaar #biometrics is based on 3 false assumptions.
1. Everybody can be enrolled for #Aadhaar
2. All data can be securely stored at a centralised repository
3. Evryone's biometric data can verified in realtime
(34/n)
A considerable number of People will be left out at the enrolment stage itself. First becoz they wont have any identity documents like ration card or election card that would enable them to register for #Aadhaar . Though there r mechanisms introducers, only abt 0.3% of
(35/n)
total number of Aadhaar issued were issued without any previously held ID docs.
Secondly a considerable number of people will have difficulties in giving biometrics.
(36/n)
Egs, manual labourers like mine workers, washermen and all will have unclear Fingerprints. People with diseases like HIV, TB, leprosy and other lethal illness will either be averse come out to some enrolment centres ir they wont be able to travel to some.
(37/n)
Then there r mentally ill persons whom we cannot convince to gv their biometrics.
Also there are differently abled people. Then there are aged poeple whose finger prints may nit be legible.
(38/n)
That is, a group of people, who r in fact very needy and helpless will b left out at the enrolment stage itself.
(39/n)
Then comes the security issue. As acknowledged in the Sri Krishna Committee's White Paper on data protection, no database can be 100% secure. Experience worldwide shows that even CIA databases r not immune to hacking. We will come back to security on another thread later.
(40/n)
3rd point, verification at point of services is also prone to exclusion as in the case of enrolment. Manual labourers, aged, children, sick persons & all will have problems with authentication. As v saw in the biometrics' thread, exclusion rates r as high as 40% at times.
(41/n)
That means, #Aadhaar is basically a tool for exclusion. This exclusion leads to death and misery. V already have 11 yr old Santoshi, a poor dalit girl, from Jarkhand and many more like her
(42/n)
So in that sense, #Aadhaar is literally a #Killer project that kills the most vulnerable section of the society.
(43/n)
Evrything, bank account, pan card, election ID, passport, and all will be cancelled.
(45/n)
Also cutting of internet to area for a certain period (as happened during the quota agitation or stonepelting ) will render evrything to a halt. no ration, money transfer, nothing...
(46/n)
This means #Aadhaar Aais an assault on almost all fundamental rights.
(47/n)
Then there is the question of Aadhaar Act and its test against FRs. As clearly spelt out in the historic 9-judge bench's verdict on #privacy P, it has to be just, fair and reasonable. Also there is a test of proportionality which includes considering alternatives.
(48/n)
From the provisions of the #Aadhaar act discussed above show that it denies even basic right to remedy of a citizen. The data collected and the whole Aadhaar architecture is disproportionate to its proposed objectives, which are at best hazy.
(49/n)
The gvt surely has not thought of alternatives to achieve the objectives in a less dangerous and covinient way . So in all counts, #Aadhaar is a deception, a scam and a dystopian monster.
#Aadhaar_How_A_Nation_is_Deceived
(50/n)
A thread on falsehood propogated by @UIDAI is here:
(51/51)

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More from @jijeeshpb

Apr 5, 2018
AG told the Supreme Court that they did a proof of the concept study before launching #Aadhaar project in rural India. This is outright lie.
(1/10)
#AG_OhJi_NoMoreLiesJi
#Aadhaar was launched in Tmbhli village in Maharashtra in 2009 by issuing first Aadhaar letter to Ranjana Sonawane, a poor tribal woman. That is the project started in rural India
#AG_OhJi_NoMoreLiesJi

(2/10)
The Proof of The Concept Report came out in 2010 only. A year after the project started. AG loed in the court. (3/10)
#AG_OhJi_NoMoreLiesJi
Read 23 tweets
Mar 16, 2018
There is nothing surprising. The very same method of finger print faking was demonstrated ere the Parliamentary Standing Committee that studied #Aadhar in 2011. @UIDAI knew this is possible. Biometrics is the least secure password of all (1/n)
#DestroyTheAadhaar
Nobody with minimum understanding of / concern about security or privacy would plan a project like this.
#AadhaarFail
(2/n)
and all those in power who decided to implement such a dangerous project like #Aadhaar , without any study or cost benfit analysis should be held accountable.
(4/n)
Read 11 tweets

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