Let's think about the Brexit impact of Windrush/Rudd:
1/
(to be clear, this isn't the most important aspect of it all, but Rudd's resignation does make for more of a connection)
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Let's start w Rudd herself.
Her resignation causes assorted Brexit headaches for May/CONs
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Most obviously, the long-mentioned 'Brexit balance' in Cabinet needs attention. May will need to give some thought how to keep this
3/
New Home Sec needs to be senior enough to handle/head off Windrush, but also a soft Brexiter, which might knock out some obvious choices
4/
Could reshuffle ppl around, but that didn't go well last time: is May willing to try moving Hunt along once more, for example?
5/
Rudd's next move also matters, esp if she hangs her hat w Soubry on the backbench. Come 'meaningful vote' time, that might count for a lot
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However, Rudd might keep powder dry, both b/c wants to get back into Cab, & b/c Windrush has tainted anything she now says
7/
Beyond Rudd, all this eats up bandwidth that HMG doesn't really have. Art.50 moving to critical phase, and HMG needs to advance debate on Irish dimension, so reshuffling comes at a bad time
8/
Especially true if May wants to turn the ship on CU/SM. Her capital was already minimal post #GE17, and this affair doens't help at all
9/
My working assumption is that May has only survived b/c no one can be sure who'll replace her, and b/c it's easier to let her own the problems of Brexit. White knight will pop up in Apr 19, to grumble how 'she let us all down'
10/
Windrush potentially shifts this, esp for soft Brexiters, who might see window to push for more liberal approach to immigration and post-EU rels
11/
However this plays out, main upshot is that HMG will continue not to be fully on ball in Art.50, so COM likely to find a continued policy gap
12/
That makes big advances for June #EUCO less likely, which in turn hardens Irish options back to C, which makes May's autumn even more painful
13/
Most of it all (for May) is that Rudd's departure isn't going to sort out anything on Windrush; Qs will continue to be asked of her (and her judgement), both narrowly & generally
14/
Remember this is the 4th Cab minister to go, plus Davis sounds ever less pleased with Robbins' role in Art.50
15/
Back in summer 2016, May seemed to have played a blinder, putting ppl into roles where they had to make good on their #EURef campaigning. Now it looks even more like being too clever
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And before I go, let's not forget that Windrush in general hasn't reassured EU27/COM about fate of EU citizens. Expect more on that front in coming weeks.
17/
In sum, it's another awful chapter in May's path through Brexit. Not yet life-threatening, but no good for anyone involved
/end
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Possibly more for me than for you, let's try to pull this week together a bit:
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Let's start with the EU side
Having largely kept heads down during conference season, yesterday's Tusk/Varadkar presser demonstrated that EU is keeping the pressure on
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The tension seems to be between COM/EUCO and IE, as @pmdfoster explained well yesterday: IE making conciliatory noises, central EU bodies pushing EU integrity line
Back in Sept, there was much talk about this being a crunch point in the UK debate, as May would come under fire for Chequers and there would be scope for changes/realignments/whatever
2/
Certainly that first bit has happened, with numerous op-eds over the weekend and assorted fringe events (inc. yesterday's Johnson speech)
3/