Here's a thread on the #Brexit#Backstop, the #Border and NI/IRL,
in which I try to succinctly explain why I think the UK govt has got itself in an unnecessary pickle on this one,
& how it might get out of it.
1/11
The Protocol is intended as ‘insurance’ in case a future UK-EU agreement is insufficient to meet the commitments made in the Joint Report bit.ly/2Bgjvj6. In that sense it is *already* conditional & envisaged as temporary.
It is a backstop, not a precursor.
2/11
The Protocol is the EU showing most flexibility (cherrypicking) *for* Northern Ireland in the very areas that the UK is finding hard to swallow, i.e. NI being in a Common Regulatory Area and the Customs Territory of the EU.
3/11
The UK govt has a choice here:
(A) accept Protocol but make sure UK-EU Agmt is so comprehensive as to ensure it never comes into play;
(B) meet EU's flexibility with flexibility of its own; or
(C) attempt to make Protocol redundant at this point.
4/11
On (A): the draft text was but a starting position for negotiation.
Of course the prospect of customs & new regulatory controls between GB & NI is unpalatable. The expectation was that the UK would propose an alternative, i.e. (B).
5/11
On (B): what flexibility could the UK show?
Recent if slightly-confused references to Lichtenstein and to special economic zones are hinting at what could work here. @MESandbu was onto something on.ft.com/2wNfqNi.
UK could allow NI to have a privileged position.
6/11
On (C ): Protocol is not just about trade; it recognises distinct needs of NI. Insistence on an all-UK, undifferentiated arrangement has created a situation in which NI/IRL issue is the greatest threat to the Withdrawal Agreement, which is both unnecessary & self-defeating.
7/11
UK govt’s refusal to consider specific arrangements for NI is due to a category error [the ‘constitutional integrity’ of the UK does not come into it – NI’s status cannot change without a referendum]
& a blind spot [refusal to recognise unique position of NI, ie 1998 Agmt].
8/11
On what grounds will UK govt not show flexibility to NI?
All parties in NI point to distinct position of NI re: Brexit. bit.ly/2y0y2yr
The DUP has called for the particular circumstances of NI to be recognised + for NI to be a ‘hub’ for trade btn the UK & Ireland.
9/11
A soft Brexit is not anathema to the DUP – in fact it is the conclusion to be drawn from its stated positions.
What is anathema to the DUP is the breakup of the UK. The best insurance against this is not a hard Brexit but properly functioning, heavy-duty devolution.
10/11
This is why the 1998 Agreement is not merely a NI concern.
What it did was institutionalise the unionist/nationalist, north/south & British/Irish cooperation necessary for peace.
Which takes us back to the need for something specific for NI…
Getting the feeling that there's too much #brexit#backstop bravado and too little sense?
Howsabout a 4 slide summary from @DPhinnemore & me setting out what we can be pretty sure of and what the UK/EU (dis)agree on - as viewed from Northern Ireland.
1/5
1st: a lack of progress on the Protocol on NI/IRL in the draft Withdrawal Agmt.
All these colours have to turn green (i.e. agreed in principle & text) before we get that Deal for exit day next March.
Note that red circle - backstop is intended to be trumped at some point. 2/5
2nd: a summary of what is agreed on and what is still missing re: @BorderIrish and NI.
Note the extent of Northern Ireland-specific arrangements.
You've seen a version of this a couple of months ago. Not much progress here since you last saw it.
A quick response to the ERG report on @BorderIrish.
First, to be welcomed:
- It has been published
- It underlines that a ‘hard’ border NI/IRL is ‘totally undesirable’
- It sees customs measures as not altering NI's constitutional position
- It makes no mention of drones. 1/
It interprets 'no hard border' specifically to mean 'no physical infrastructure at the border'.
This appears to mean no limit to checks + inspections away from the border & entailing huge administrative burdens for cross-border traders.
So ‘no hard border’ ≠ frictionless. 2/
Vision of what could be done post-Brexit rests on several assumptions:
no UK-EU tariffs; broad ‘equivalence’; continuation of privileges of EU membership (e.g. access to VIES); close bilateral cooperation with Ireland;
and unfalteringly deep UK-EU mutual trust.
3/
A bit of context-setting (plus explanation of our imaginative colour coding).
The White Paper is in part an effort by UK govt to prove a NI-specific #backstop to be unnecessary. But remember Protocol for NI/IRL in the Withdrawal Agmt is abt much more than a customs border.
2/10
A reminder of where we are up to on that Protocol on NI/IRL in the draft Withdrawal Agreement.
With added stars 🌟 to identify which bits the White Paper attempts to address (or negate) most directly.
There is a lot that is very welcome & very good to see in the UK Govt #Brexit White Paper, from the point of view of Northern Ireland, North/South cooperation & @BelfastAgmt
There is repeated mention of the UK & EU 'meeting their shared commitments to Northern Ireland & Ireland', esp. in Exec Summary.
And it states the UK wishes to see a future UK-EU partnership 'honouring the letter & the spirit of the Belfast (‘Good Friday’) Agreement'.
2/
Evidence of honouring the letter of @BelfastAgmt comes primarily in relation to areas of north/south cooperation.
The Mapping Exercise of cross-border links conducted before the Joint Report of Dec'17 appears to be bearing fruit in the form of specific areas identified here.
3/