*Brexit at the Border: Voices from local communities in the Central Border Region of Ireland/Northern Ireland*
An initiative by @QUBelfast & @europe_icban to gather data on the immediate & anticipated effects of #Brexit for those living on the #Border qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexitf…
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Here are some of the key findings from the report in slide form.
First an overview of the study itself:
Rich qualitative data (online survey & focus groups) gathered across the Central Border Region. Detailed examples & viewpoints heard from people on both sides of #border.
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Respondents to the survey came from across the 8 local authority areas of the Central Border Region, moreorless equally from both sides of the border. 50/50 male/female. 80% 31-65 yrs.
There were far fewer Leave-voting respondents so they got extra attention in our analysis.
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Comparing Leave & Remain voters is interesting, tho wouldn't exaggerate the claims here (not intended as a representative quant study).
Leave-voting respondents less likely than Remain to anticipate a hard border, less likely to completely rely on services across the border
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6 out of 10 respondents reported heavy reliance on access to services on other side of the border.
Survey & focus groups were full of examples of the cross-border nature of people's lives. This is what is missed with focus on trade. It's also why people fear a hard border.
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Brexit is already having impact in the Central Border Region.
The uncertainty is itself causing harm & raising anxiety.
When decisions are made, they tend not to benefit cross-border coop or border region devt.
Some positive effects reported, mainly re: devaluation of £STG.
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People feel well informed about Brexit (more so than last year- see Bordering on Brexit report go.qub.ac.uk/bordering).
But they also feel more gloomy about likelihood of a hard border, which only a tiny few respondents say they wish to see (& for different reasons).
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Of course, we asked about technological solutions. 1/2 said they wouldn't be willing to see these in place, even as alternative to manned checkpoints. Some expressed pragmatism (esp Leave voters); others raised deep concerns about surveillance & straight-up ineffectiveness.
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Concerns about technology, infrastructure & any 'hardening' of the border are not just about avoiding making targets for violence.
Many try to explain how the practical, ordinary & symbolic aspects of Peace in this region are interlinked with current openness of the Border.
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Representation: c. 1/2 of respondents, no matter their background, have a fairly negative view re: representation of the Border Region in the Brexit negotiations.
Remain-voting respondents are much more anxious about this. Some have suggestions as to what might be done.
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Getting the feeling that there's too much #brexit#backstop bravado and too little sense?
Howsabout a 4 slide summary from @DPhinnemore & me setting out what we can be pretty sure of and what the UK/EU (dis)agree on - as viewed from Northern Ireland.
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1st: a lack of progress on the Protocol on NI/IRL in the draft Withdrawal Agmt.
All these colours have to turn green (i.e. agreed in principle & text) before we get that Deal for exit day next March.
Note that red circle - backstop is intended to be trumped at some point. 2/5
2nd: a summary of what is agreed on and what is still missing re: @BorderIrish and NI.
Note the extent of Northern Ireland-specific arrangements.
You've seen a version of this a couple of months ago. Not much progress here since you last saw it.
A quick response to the ERG report on @BorderIrish.
First, to be welcomed:
- It has been published
- It underlines that a ‘hard’ border NI/IRL is ‘totally undesirable’
- It sees customs measures as not altering NI's constitutional position
- It makes no mention of drones. 1/
It interprets 'no hard border' specifically to mean 'no physical infrastructure at the border'.
This appears to mean no limit to checks + inspections away from the border & entailing huge administrative burdens for cross-border traders.
So ‘no hard border’ ≠ frictionless. 2/
Vision of what could be done post-Brexit rests on several assumptions:
no UK-EU tariffs; broad ‘equivalence’; continuation of privileges of EU membership (e.g. access to VIES); close bilateral cooperation with Ireland;
and unfalteringly deep UK-EU mutual trust.
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A bit of context-setting (plus explanation of our imaginative colour coding).
The White Paper is in part an effort by UK govt to prove a NI-specific #backstop to be unnecessary. But remember Protocol for NI/IRL in the Withdrawal Agmt is abt much more than a customs border.
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A reminder of where we are up to on that Protocol on NI/IRL in the draft Withdrawal Agreement.
With added stars 🌟 to identify which bits the White Paper attempts to address (or negate) most directly.
There is a lot that is very welcome & very good to see in the UK Govt #Brexit White Paper, from the point of view of Northern Ireland, North/South cooperation & @BelfastAgmt
There is repeated mention of the UK & EU 'meeting their shared commitments to Northern Ireland & Ireland', esp. in Exec Summary.
And it states the UK wishes to see a future UK-EU partnership 'honouring the letter & the spirit of the Belfast (‘Good Friday’) Agreement'.
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Evidence of honouring the letter of @BelfastAgmt comes primarily in relation to areas of north/south cooperation.
The Mapping Exercise of cross-border links conducted before the Joint Report of Dec'17 appears to be bearing fruit in the form of specific areas identified here.
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