Interesting polling covering GB, NI & IRL. More evidence of layering of Leave/Remain differences upon existing polarisation within NI.
This is why zero-sum (ie land v. sea #border) #brexit narratives (& poss. outcomes) pose direct risks to peace & the Agmt lordashcroftpolls.com/2018/06/brexit…
I can't help but say, tho, that the phrasing of some of the Qs asked is unfortunate, e.g. on possible 'different status' of NI (ref. customs checks in sea ports) or a hard border risking paramilitary attacks.
This serves to *perpetuate* distortions of sensitive & nuanced matters.
+ as for the statement (for respondents to agree/disagree with) on technological solutions --
"Modern technology would allow any customs checks to be done quickly and easily, so a border would not be damaging or disruptive" --
What purpose/value does this have in an opinion poll?
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Getting the feeling that there's too much #brexit#backstop bravado and too little sense?
Howsabout a 4 slide summary from @DPhinnemore & me setting out what we can be pretty sure of and what the UK/EU (dis)agree on - as viewed from Northern Ireland.
1/5
1st: a lack of progress on the Protocol on NI/IRL in the draft Withdrawal Agmt.
All these colours have to turn green (i.e. agreed in principle & text) before we get that Deal for exit day next March.
Note that red circle - backstop is intended to be trumped at some point. 2/5
2nd: a summary of what is agreed on and what is still missing re: @BorderIrish and NI.
Note the extent of Northern Ireland-specific arrangements.
You've seen a version of this a couple of months ago. Not much progress here since you last saw it.
A quick response to the ERG report on @BorderIrish.
First, to be welcomed:
- It has been published
- It underlines that a ‘hard’ border NI/IRL is ‘totally undesirable’
- It sees customs measures as not altering NI's constitutional position
- It makes no mention of drones. 1/
It interprets 'no hard border' specifically to mean 'no physical infrastructure at the border'.
This appears to mean no limit to checks + inspections away from the border & entailing huge administrative burdens for cross-border traders.
So ‘no hard border’ ≠ frictionless. 2/
Vision of what could be done post-Brexit rests on several assumptions:
no UK-EU tariffs; broad ‘equivalence’; continuation of privileges of EU membership (e.g. access to VIES); close bilateral cooperation with Ireland;
and unfalteringly deep UK-EU mutual trust.
3/
A bit of context-setting (plus explanation of our imaginative colour coding).
The White Paper is in part an effort by UK govt to prove a NI-specific #backstop to be unnecessary. But remember Protocol for NI/IRL in the Withdrawal Agmt is abt much more than a customs border.
2/10
A reminder of where we are up to on that Protocol on NI/IRL in the draft Withdrawal Agreement.
With added stars 🌟 to identify which bits the White Paper attempts to address (or negate) most directly.
There is a lot that is very welcome & very good to see in the UK Govt #Brexit White Paper, from the point of view of Northern Ireland, North/South cooperation & @BelfastAgmt
There is repeated mention of the UK & EU 'meeting their shared commitments to Northern Ireland & Ireland', esp. in Exec Summary.
And it states the UK wishes to see a future UK-EU partnership 'honouring the letter & the spirit of the Belfast (‘Good Friday’) Agreement'.
2/
Evidence of honouring the letter of @BelfastAgmt comes primarily in relation to areas of north/south cooperation.
The Mapping Exercise of cross-border links conducted before the Joint Report of Dec'17 appears to be bearing fruit in the form of specific areas identified here.
3/