2. Florida graded "unsatisfactory" re: use of paper: "Depending on the jurisdiction, some voters in Florida cast paper ballots, while others vote using paperless DRE machines."
3. Florida graded "unsatisfactory" re: post-election audits: "While Florida conducts a form of post-election review, its use of paperless DRE machines prevents it from carrying out audits that can confirm the accuracy of election outcomes... "
4. FLA's audits are also "unsatisfactory" bc "There is no...reqmt that an audit escalate [to a full recount] in the event that preliminary outcomes are found to be incorrect," & "There is no...reqmt on whether an audit can reverse election results if an error is detected."
5. FLA was rated "incomplete" re: voter registration cybersecurity standards because state officials refused to provide any information!
6. OH graded "fair" re: use of paper bc it uses both paper ballots and touchscreens w/ Voter Verifiable Paper Records ("VVPR"). VVPRs are the same as Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails ("VVPATs"). VVPATs are almost as bad as paperless, as explained here: medium.com/@jennycohn1/to…
7. OH graded "fair" re: post-election audits. While jurisdictions may
use a “simple, percentage-based post-election audit or a risk-limiting audit,” the
state recommends conducting risk-limiting audits. The state’s post-election audits are conducted through manual hand count.
8. OH graded "incomplete" re: voter registration system cybersecurity measures because it would not provide information on this issue!
9. Michigan rated "good" re: its use of paper because it deploys paper ballots throughout the state.
10. But Michigan's post-election audits received a grade of "unsatisfactory" because the "review does not compare ballot totals in a meaningful way."
11. Michigan received a grade of "fair" re: its voter registration systems.
12. BTW, Michigan allows a recount only if the margin is 2,000 votes or less, & election officials get to decide if the recount will be conducted by hand or machine. Candidates or voters can also petition for recounts at their OWN EXPENSE if they assert “fraud of mistake.”
13. Source for post 12. (This info. did not come from the Center for American Progress report.) ceimn.org/ceimn-state-re…
14. While I'm discussing recounts, Florida allows a hand recount only if the victory margin is less than .25%! This tells hackers that they can avoid a hand recount simply by flipping enough votes so that this margin is exceeded. ceimn.org/ceimn-state-re…
15. Similarly, Ohio allows a hand recount of state-wide elections only if the margin of victory is .25% or less ! ceimn.org/ceimn-state-re… …
16. The Center for American Progress report gave Pennsylvania a grade of "unsatisfactory" re: its use of paper bc whereas some counties use paper ballots, others [JSC Note: 80%] use paperless machines. On 2/9, PA passed a law to improve this, but the law has glaring holes.
17. PA's post-election audits received a grade of "unsatisfactory."
18. On the bright side, PA received a grade of "good" regarding its voter registration system cybsersecurity measures.
19. WI received a grade of "fair" re: its use of paper bc it uses a combination of paper ballots & touchscreens w/ VVPRs. I think this grade is overly generous. As explained in my Medium article, VVPRs (aka VVPATs) are almost as bad as paperless machines. medium.com/@jennycohn1/to…
20. WI received a grade of "unsatisfactory" re: its post-election audits.
21. WI received a grade of "good" re: its cybsersecurity standards for voter registration.
22. WI does not appear to have any sort of mandatory recount law at all! Rather, candidates can petition 4 a recount AT THEIR OWN EXPENSE based on mistake or fraud & they have the burden to prove why the recount must be conducted by hand vs machine. ceimn.org/ceimn-state-re…
23. In 2016, recall that the court refused to order a hand recount in Wisconsin, leaving the issue up to the counties. jsonline.com/story/news/pol…
25. As indicated in this Thread, most recount laws allow hand recounts (if at all) only if the victory margin is less than a small percent (e.g., .5% or .25%), which merely tells hackers that they can avoid a hand recount by flipping enough votes to exceed that margin.
26. Thus, in addition to switching to 100% paper ballots, states must implement laws requiring meaningful post-election audits for every race. Experts recommend a type of manual statistical audit called a Risk Limiting Audit & thus we must demand that states take their advice.
27. I discuss Risk Limiting Audits ("RLAs") in posts 5-8 of the Thread linked here:
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28. Plz note that I disagree w/ the American Progress report to the extent it deems VVPR's (aka VVPATs) "satisfactory." As discussed in my Medium article, VVPATs are hard to audit. Voters rarely review them for accuracy & don't notice flips when they do. medium.com/@jennycohn1/to…
Study shows that people of all political persuasions are willing to modify their beliefs based on corrective info from reliable sources, but “subjects ‘re-believed’ the false info when retested a week later.” 1/ news.northeastern.edu/2018/06/18/tir…
2/ The author of the article says It may help to warn people in advance that they are likely to forget the correction bc “this helps them mentally tag the bogus information as false.”
3/ It’s also “important that the corrective information be repeated as frequently, and with even greater clarity, than the myth.”
I hate to be the bearer of bad tidings but elections have been electronically suspect starting long before the Trump/Russia scandal. This article is lulling folks into a false sense of security, which is dangerous. Domestic hackers & insiders were always an equal threat. 1/
I agree, tho not enuf time (and 0 political will) to do this in Nov. Wish it were different. For now I hope to stop states from doubling up on electronics w/ touchscreen ballot markers. Using electronics to count votes is bad enuf. Having them mark our ballots too is nuts. 1/
Nuts except for those who are unable to hand mark their ballots. Once you have hand marked paper ballots they can be either scanned or hand counted (my preference) or both. 2/
Any time u put a machine between the voter and the paper record of voter intent there is an opportunity for programming mischief. Here is just the latest example.: 3/
I’m hoping some of the cyber experts who signed the letter about the risks of using cellular modems to transfer election results can answer this question. Thx! @philipbstark@SEGreenhalgh@rad_atl@jhalderm
Seeing as no one has answered yet, I will say that even if the cellular modems CAN be configured to bypass the internet, we should not have to blindly trust that vendors or whoever else is hired to set them up will do that.
Kathy Rogers, the face & voice of @ESSVote, which has installed CELLULAR MODEMS in tabulators in WI & FL, is cozying up to @DHSgov which refuses to advise states to remove the modems despite a letter from 30 cyber experts & EI groups stating it should do so. #CorruptElections 1/
The notion that cellular modems affect only “unofficial” results is bogus bc, among other reasons, in certain jurisdictions, unofficial results become the official results once added to absentees & provisionals—sometimes w/o ever comparing them to the precinct results tapes! 1/
And Wisconsin doesn’t even require that counties publicly post the results tapes so that the public itself can make this comparison! (I don’t know about Florida, Michigan, & Illinois.) 2/
Thus, we must simply trust that someone trustworthy is conducting this due diligence. In Johnson County, Kansas, the County acknowledged that it does NOT conduct this basic due diligence. 3/