1. New Jersey (like Georgia) still exclusively uses PAPERLESS (unverifiable) voting machines! "[L]awmakers took ... measures in 2005 and 2007 to require paper ballots and audits of them, but a lack of funding meant neither law has been implemented." northjersey.com/story/news/new…
2. This sort of conundrum (legislation requiring paper ballots, but no funding 2 implement) is why we must call our reps in the U.S. Congress 2 demand they pass the proposed $400 M allocation toward paper ballots & other election security measures!
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3. Computer Science Professor Andrew Appel said this about New Jersey's paperless voting machines: "'I'm quite concerned ... If it [hacking] hasn't happened yet, which we DON'T KNOW because we can't audit the results, that doesn't mean it won't happen.'" northjersey.com/story/news/new…
4. But election officials have "downplayed the risk of large-scale fraud, since NJ's voting machines are not connected to the Internet." (See article in post 3.) As explained in my thread re: EAC commissioner Hicks, such claims are outrageously misleading.
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5. As explained by IT Professor Appel, the internet CAN be used to hack ALL voting machines bc ALL voting machines--both touchscreens & optical scanners--receive programming b4 each election from centralized election computers that connect to the internet!
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6. IT Professor Halderman has also explained how hackers can infect voting machines by attacking the centralized election programming computers.
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7.
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8. Moreover, results from the precincts are often transmitted into a central tabulator over a LOCAL AREA NETWORK, so that the “chain-of-custody of the images is not provable, and images MAY BE MANIPULATED IN TRANSMISSION by network-based attacks.” d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/jillstein/page… …
9. Central tabulators, in turn, transmit results to ONLINE election night reporting systems creating another opportunity for internet hacking of voting machine tallies.
10. In Georgia, for example, a flash drive transfers results from the central tabulator to the ONLINE election night reporting system, & that SAME flash drive is then REINSERTED into the tabulator for the next round of memory cards. medium.com/@marilynrmarks… … …
11. NJ appears to have a system similar to Georgia, which is NOT good. Georgia's top election officials, like those in NJ, has also misled its voters about the system's vulnerability to hacking.
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12. Assemblyman @andrewzwicker is "a sponsor of a bill to require New Jersey counties to use voting machines that PRODUCE A PAPER RECORD of each vote cast." northjersey.com/story/news/new…
13. I am sure this bill has a noble intent, but the phrase "produce a paper record" does not sound like having voters HAND mark paper ballots, which are then counted either on optical scanners or by hand.
14. Rather, it sounds like the proposed NJ legislation would allow so-called Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails ("VVPATs") and computer marked ballots or printouts from so-called Ballot Marking Devices (aka "electronic pencils").
15. Studies show that VVPATs are a scam because most voters (a) don't review the VVPATs (b) don't notice errors in the VVPATs even when they undertake such review and (c) are EXTREMELY UNLIKELY to do anything about errors even if discovered.
16. I discuss and link to the studies referenced in Post 15 about the "VVPAT scam" here. medium.com/@jennycohn1/to…
17. To be sure, some election integrity groups continue to give VVPATs a passing grade. But I am told that one or more of those groups was behind the initial push for VVPATs w/o having adequately studied them, which may be why they hesitate now to call them the disaster they are.
18. Thus, before taking advice from anyone--including an expert--on VVPATs, NJ should make sure that person is aware of the studies linked in my medium article at post 16 and is not relying on claims by groups who pushed for VVPATs to begin with.
19. In any event, even those who maintain that VVPATs are "adequate" nonetheless express a strong preference for hand marked paper ballots.
20. Which brings me to my next point. Computer marked ballots or paper printouts from ballot marking devices ("electronic pencils") are no better--and potentially worse, due to the use of BAR CODES on the prinouts--than VVPATs from DREs when it comes to election security.
21. I discuss the danger of buying ballot marking devices "for all" (as opposed to limiting their use primarily to those who are unable to hand mark their ballots) in the sourced article linked here.
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22. I also discussed the dangers of ballot marking devices "for all" when I was interviewed by long-time election integrity advocate Brad Friedman on his radio show earlier this week.
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23. If @andrewzwicker's proposed legislation is designed to allow VVPATs and/or ballot marking devices "for all," I hope he will read this Thread and reach out to me or Brad Friedman if he has any further questions.
24. This post suggests that an amendment to the @andrewzwicker bill would require actual hand marked PAPER BALLOTS, plus funding (necessary given what happened in 2005/07, and mandatory manual audits.
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25. I do not have a copy of the bill and proposed "Coalition for Peace Action" amendment, but would be pleased to review them if forwarded to me. @andrewzwicker@IndivisibleLNH
26. In the meantime, i will do whatever I can to help bring hand marked paper ballots to states that do not yet make them available for ALL voters who are able to hand mark ballots.
27. And let's not forget about the need for statistical manual audits for every race. Paper ballots do no good whatsoever if, as is the case in nearly all states now, there is no meaningful mechanism that allows them to be hand counted! twitter.com/twitter/status…
Study shows that people of all political persuasions are willing to modify their beliefs based on corrective info from reliable sources, but “subjects ‘re-believed’ the false info when retested a week later.” 1/ news.northeastern.edu/2018/06/18/tir…
2/ The author of the article says It may help to warn people in advance that they are likely to forget the correction bc “this helps them mentally tag the bogus information as false.”
3/ It’s also “important that the corrective information be repeated as frequently, and with even greater clarity, than the myth.”
I hate to be the bearer of bad tidings but elections have been electronically suspect starting long before the Trump/Russia scandal. This article is lulling folks into a false sense of security, which is dangerous. Domestic hackers & insiders were always an equal threat. 1/
I agree, tho not enuf time (and 0 political will) to do this in Nov. Wish it were different. For now I hope to stop states from doubling up on electronics w/ touchscreen ballot markers. Using electronics to count votes is bad enuf. Having them mark our ballots too is nuts. 1/
Nuts except for those who are unable to hand mark their ballots. Once you have hand marked paper ballots they can be either scanned or hand counted (my preference) or both. 2/
Any time u put a machine between the voter and the paper record of voter intent there is an opportunity for programming mischief. Here is just the latest example.: 3/
I’m hoping some of the cyber experts who signed the letter about the risks of using cellular modems to transfer election results can answer this question. Thx! @philipbstark@SEGreenhalgh@rad_atl@jhalderm
Seeing as no one has answered yet, I will say that even if the cellular modems CAN be configured to bypass the internet, we should not have to blindly trust that vendors or whoever else is hired to set them up will do that.
Kathy Rogers, the face & voice of @ESSVote, which has installed CELLULAR MODEMS in tabulators in WI & FL, is cozying up to @DHSgov which refuses to advise states to remove the modems despite a letter from 30 cyber experts & EI groups stating it should do so. #CorruptElections 1/
The notion that cellular modems affect only “unofficial” results is bogus bc, among other reasons, in certain jurisdictions, unofficial results become the official results once added to absentees & provisionals—sometimes w/o ever comparing them to the precinct results tapes! 1/
And Wisconsin doesn’t even require that counties publicly post the results tapes so that the public itself can make this comparison! (I don’t know about Florida, Michigan, & Illinois.) 2/
Thus, we must simply trust that someone trustworthy is conducting this due diligence. In Johnson County, Kansas, the County acknowledged that it does NOT conduct this basic due diligence. 3/