Today, @CER_EU publishes my piece on #Brexit and #JHA. I have been looking at this for 1,5 years so I hope I did not make too many mistakes (links to piece - cer.eu/publications/a… and opens thread)
At the outset of the #Brexit process, most people assumed that a deal on #police and #judicial co-operation was easier to get than one on #trade. Time has shown this is not the case. Ongoing co-op on #JHA is one of the few items yet to be agreed on #withdrawal deal. Why?
Well, because the #EU and #UK's opening positions in the #negotiation are incompatible: Britain wants a #bespoke agreement with the EU, a la #Schengen, but is not willing to accept #ECJ or #EUCharter. EU wants to replicate existing models. What to do?
The solution, as usual, will be a #halfway house. The UK could replicate the #extradition agreement the EU has with #Norway and #Iceland, but this will take time and will mean many #EU countries will not surrender their nationals to Britain.
#Britain could also retain indirect access to the #Schengen Information System, like #US and #Canada. This will allow Britain to obtain information, although it will need to ask #Europol, or a friendly #EU or #Schengen country to interrogate the database on its behalf.
The UK could try to get a deep partnership with #Europol, like #Denmark or the #US. It will be allowed to post liaison officers to the agency but won't have direct access to @Europol's databases.
All these are elements from existing models, as the EU wants. But the UK could also get its way if they were to be part of an 'overarching' #security treaty, which could be a stand alone deal or part of the wider #Brexit arrangement. The second option is better, because...
But none of this can happen until #London clarifies its position on the #ECJ (@theresa_may said in Munich that she may be open to a certain level of oversight in this area) and the #EU#Charter of #FundamentalRights (in the midst of a ping-pong game in @UKParliament)
For a more detailed analysis of #JHA models of co-operation between the #EU and non-EU countries, and on Britain's realistic options, see (links to piece again and closes thread) cer.eu/publications/a…
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OK, now I stop the jokes and get serious on #SOTEU and #JHA (opens thread). @JunckerEU: "We are proposing to extend the tasks of the newly established European Public Prosecutor’s Office to include the fight against #terrorist offences."
I'm still sceptic about the original role of the #EPPO (financial offences to #EU money) and how that is going to pan out in the future (more on this soon, part of the @CER_EU's upcoming work on #JHA). I'm even more sceptic about proposals to use it for #AML. But terrorism?
This has been an old aspiration of federalists and others: some sort of a central EU criminal prosecutor (and criminal code, for what matters) to deal with cross-border crime. But that is absolutely unfeasible right now. See the latest difficulties in judicial co-operation.
OK, some context on #Spain: last week, a court found that the ruling #PP had been using irregular funds for years. The Socialist party (#PSOE) launched a motion of non confidence, which is being discussed today in Parliament (opens thread)
Initially,nobody in #Europe cared much:after all, this was to be the second time #Rajoy was questioned by the Parliament (last year, on an initiative by #Podemos) and Socialist leader #Sanchez (who is not an MP, as he lost his seat last year) did not seem to have too much support
Mainly because he needs 176 votes, which he can only get if MOST regional parties (including heavily pro-indy forces in #Catalonia and #basquecountry) support him, as #Ciudadanos has said they would not support the motion, because they want new elections.