Election integrity alert! 350 precincts voted in the Texas Dist. 19 election, which surprisingly FLIPPED RED. Of those, 221 were in blue Bexar county, the 4th largest county in TX. Bexar uses ES&S ivotronic PAPERLESS touchscreen voting machines. @PeteGallegoTX@BetoORourke 1/
3/ Texas Secretary of State report showing that 350 precincts were involved in the District 19 special election (that suprisingly flipped red), with 221 in blue Bexar county. enrpages.sos.state.tx.us/public/jul31_3…
6/ It looks like the next largest county involved in the District 19 election was Medina with its population of 50k (verses Bexar's 1.96 million). Per Verified Voting, Medina uses a combination of paperless touchscreens and scanners (paper ballots).
7/ Report on the ES&S ivotronic (the type of machine used in Bexar county, Texas, the 4th largest county in the state.
8/ One other county in the District 19 election, Brewster county, also used PAPERLESS voting machines (again, the ES&S ivotronic). That county is Brewster county, w/ a population of 9,337. verifiedvoting.org/verifier/#year…
9/ Although just two of the 17 counties that voted in the Dist. 19 election used paperless (unverifiable) voting machines, those 2 counties (Bexar and Brewster) accounted for about 14k of the 26k votes cast in the election. enrpages.sos.state.tx.us/public/jul31_3…
10/ In other words, more than half of the votes in the Texas District 19 election, which surprised everyone by flipping RED, came from paperless 100% unverifiable touchscreen voting machines.
11/ Looking ahead to @BetoORourke's Texas senate race against Ted Cruz, we have a serious election integrity problem because all of the counties shown in dark brown use paperless unverifiable voting machines. verifiedvoting.org/verifier/#year…
12/ Equally alarming, Travis county (the fifth largest county in Texas) recently replaced its touchscreen voting machines with ES&S's touchscreen barcode balloting system called the ExpressVote, which I discuss in detail here. medium.com/@jennycohn1/st…
13/ Some ES&S ExpressVote machines can circumvent even manual recounts and manual audits with what an esteemed cybersecurity election expert calls a "permission to cheat" feature. freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/09/14/ser…
I discovered & exposed this "permission to cheat" feature in my @tytinvestigates piece re: Johnson County, Kansas & its use of ExpressVote machines that have this feature. Below is an excerpt quoting @philipbstark (inventor of Risk Limiting Audits). 14/
15/ I don't know if the ExpressVote machines purchased by Travis County have this feature, but will try to find out. Even if they don't, however, there are many problems with these touchscreen machines that vendors & election officials misleadingly call "paper ballot systems."
16/ Here, again, is my Medium article discussing the many problems with touchscreens generally and touchscreen barcode ballot markers like the ExpressVote specifically. medium.com/@jennycohn1/st…
17/ I had thought that Harris county, the largest county in the state, had bought the ExpressVote, but I can't find a reference to that, so I probably was wrong. But historically, Harris County's electronic election-related equipment has been problematic.
18/ We must keep an eye on Harris County (the largest county in Texas) & ensure it switches to HAND MARKED paper ballots (w/ scanners), not the ExpressVote or other touchscreen system. It currently uses paperless/unverifiable touchscreen voting machines. verifiedvoting.org/verifier/#year…
19/ BTW, I don't mean 2 suggest that scanners are immune from hacking. They can be easily hacked too! But if they count hand marked paper ballots, there is a software independent record of voter intent that can be manually counted 2 confirm the legitimacy of the electronic tally.
20/ Here is @lulufriesdat's video from DEFCON showing that ES&S 650 optical scanners--used in 24 states, including Texas--can be rigged to flip votes with less than 1 minute access. In other words, #handmarked#paperballots are necessary but insufficient. facebook.com/NowThisPolitic…
21/ To have evidence-based elections, a term coined by @philipbstark (inventor of risk limiting audits), we need #handmarked#paperballots, a transparent and secure chain of custody, and post election manual counts (meaningful audits or full recounts).
22/ Like many (perhaps most) states, Texas has a long way to go toward evidence-based elections, and if we let it continue to buy more touchscreens, we will never get there.
23/ Meanwhile, according to McClatchy, some Texas counties have already replaced PAPERLESS unverifiable touchscreen machines with new PAPERLESS unverifiable touchscreen machines from Hart Intercivic. This is incompatible w/ a functioning democracy. mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-wo…
24/ As far as the midterms, there are too many attack vectors to plug them all, especially given Texas's use of unverifiable voting machines. But here are two strategies outlined in a booklet by election integrity advocate @BevHarrisWrites that can help. blackboxvoting.org/toolkit.pdf
25/ The first strategy--having poll observers at each precinct to photograph the voting machine results tapes (after polls close) & then comparing them to the reported results--is one I've been promoting, but we really need campaigns like @BetoORourke's to take the lead.
26/ If we deploy this strategy, I suggest focusing on the 5 largest counties with touchscreen machines. At a minimum, Harris County. If there are anomalies, it can provide the basis for an election challenge & perhaps (as we've seen recently w/ a GOP primary in GA) a new election
27/ Many (perhaps all) of the suggestions on this election integrity tip card that @Jodi______ and I prepared would help in Texas too. It would be great if @BetoORourke's campaign would circulate it to voters as a postcard.
28/ As for screenshotting election night results as they come in (suggestion two in the booklet in post 24), @SwissTriple_M and I (especially M) gave a trial run of this re: the #OH12 special election. Pls let us know if u would like to help with this in Beto's race v. Ted Cruz.
29/ Correction re: Posts 9 & 10. The total number of votes cast in the runoff was 44k (not 26k) of which MORE THAN HALF came from PAPERLESS (unverifiable) TOUCHSCREEN machines in Bexar & Brewster counties. This is incompatible w/ a functioning democracy. enrpages.sos.state.tx.us/public/sep18_3…
30/ The mistake in my original posts 9 and 10 was that I was looking at the primaries, not the runoff. But the ratio ended up being more or less the same in the corrected version.
31/ I just called Bexar county and it does NOT give voters the option of hand marking a ballot if they request to do so at the polls. Some states/counties with touchscreen voting machines provide this option. Not Bexar. #ProtectOurVotes
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Study shows that people of all political persuasions are willing to modify their beliefs based on corrective info from reliable sources, but “subjects ‘re-believed’ the false info when retested a week later.” 1/ news.northeastern.edu/2018/06/18/tir…
2/ The author of the article says It may help to warn people in advance that they are likely to forget the correction bc “this helps them mentally tag the bogus information as false.”
3/ It’s also “important that the corrective information be repeated as frequently, and with even greater clarity, than the myth.”
I hate to be the bearer of bad tidings but elections have been electronically suspect starting long before the Trump/Russia scandal. This article is lulling folks into a false sense of security, which is dangerous. Domestic hackers & insiders were always an equal threat. 1/
I agree, tho not enuf time (and 0 political will) to do this in Nov. Wish it were different. For now I hope to stop states from doubling up on electronics w/ touchscreen ballot markers. Using electronics to count votes is bad enuf. Having them mark our ballots too is nuts. 1/
Nuts except for those who are unable to hand mark their ballots. Once you have hand marked paper ballots they can be either scanned or hand counted (my preference) or both. 2/
Any time u put a machine between the voter and the paper record of voter intent there is an opportunity for programming mischief. Here is just the latest example.: 3/
I’m hoping some of the cyber experts who signed the letter about the risks of using cellular modems to transfer election results can answer this question. Thx! @philipbstark@SEGreenhalgh@rad_atl@jhalderm
Seeing as no one has answered yet, I will say that even if the cellular modems CAN be configured to bypass the internet, we should not have to blindly trust that vendors or whoever else is hired to set them up will do that.
Kathy Rogers, the face & voice of @ESSVote, which has installed CELLULAR MODEMS in tabulators in WI & FL, is cozying up to @DHSgov which refuses to advise states to remove the modems despite a letter from 30 cyber experts & EI groups stating it should do so. #CorruptElections 1/
The notion that cellular modems affect only “unofficial” results is bogus bc, among other reasons, in certain jurisdictions, unofficial results become the official results once added to absentees & provisionals—sometimes w/o ever comparing them to the precinct results tapes! 1/
And Wisconsin doesn’t even require that counties publicly post the results tapes so that the public itself can make this comparison! (I don’t know about Florida, Michigan, & Illinois.) 2/
Thus, we must simply trust that someone trustworthy is conducting this due diligence. In Johnson County, Kansas, the County acknowledged that it does NOT conduct this basic due diligence. 3/